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CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE:
HOW TO LOOK AT CONTRARIES
AUTHOR MEETS CRITIC:

AN OVERALL-COMPLEMENTARITY-SEEKING ACCOUNT
THAT INCLUDES AND TRANSCENDS HARMONIOUSCOMPLEMENTARITY-SEEKING PERSPECTIVE:
A COMMENTARY ON CHENYANG LI’S
CONFUCIAN HARMONY-SEEKING ACCOUNT
BO MOU
In this paper, I have two related purposes in the context of this “constructiveengagement dialogue” section: first, I will present a further expanded version of my
previously suggested and explained “overall-complementarity-seeking” account on the
methodological issue of how to adequately look at (the tensions and conflicts of)
contraries (including both non-mental contraries in the natural world and mental
ideological contraries in the human society as part of the inclusive natural world);
second, I will give a commentary on the methodological portion of Chenyang Li’s
Confucian account of seeking harmony. These two purposes are related in this context
to this extent. On the one hand, examining Li’s harmony-seeking methodological
approach will provide a valuable opportunity for my critical reflection, and thus giving
a more refined elaboration, on my own account which includes some new contents that
have yet to be published before. On the other hand, for an effective presentation and
explanation of my commentary on Li’s harmony-seeking methodological approach to
the issue of how to look at contraries, and with consideration that my commentary is
not piece-meal and tactic on individual “trees” but more strategic and holistic on “forest”
regarding the addressed methodological issue of how to look at contraries, giving my
positive account as a whole will provide a due background and holistic explanatory
basis on which to present and explain my commentary.
In this way, my strategy is this. In section 1, I present and explain an expanded
version of my previously suggested overall-complementarity-seeking account of how
________________________
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to look at contraries.1 In section 2, I present a commentary on Li’s Confucian harmonyseeking account. In the appendix, some preliminary conceptual /explanatory resources
and their associated distinctions are presented for the sake of more clearly and
accurately characterizing the structure and content of a theoretic approach.
1. AN OVERALL-COMPLEMENTARITY-SEEKING ACCOUNT OF HOW
TO LOOK AT CONTRARIES: HOW IT INCLUDES AND TRANSCENDS
A HARMONIOUS-COMPLEMENTARITY-SEEKING PERSPECTIVE
In this section, I give a cross-tradition engaging examination of the yin-yang model and
Hegelian model of how to look at interaction and transformation of contraries as two
representative, most influential methodological guiding strategies in looking at the due
relation between contraries, respectively in the Chinese and Western traditions. My
goal is to suggest and explain an overall-complementarity-seeking account of how to
adequately look at contraries, in view of the two models as two engaging source models
of adequate methodological guiding principle, whose due roles and applications are
sensitive to the nature of conflict between contraries and situations. In section 1.1, I
examine the yin-yang methodological model as suggested in the Yi-Jing text through
the Yi-Jing philosophy (especially in view of its metaphysical foundation and truthconcern basis). In section 1.2, I then present the basic methodological points of the
Hegelian model, as suggested in Hegel’s philosophy, emphatically explaining some of
its methodological points that are especially philosophically interesting and engaging.
In section 1.3, after discussing how it is possible for the yin-yang model to work
together with the Hegelian model, I suggest and explain an overall-complementarityseeking account of how to adequately look at the due relation of contraries; in so doing,
I also explain how this account includes and transcends a harmoniouscomplementarity-seeking perspective.
1.1

YIN-YANG METHODOLOGICAL MODEL OF HOW TO LOOK AT
CONTRARIES: METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION AND

In the following, I first briefly exmaine the metaphysical foundation and the truthconcern basis of the yin-yang methodological model of how to look at contraries; I then,
explain distinct crucial features of the yin-yang model.
1.1.1

YI-JING TEXT, YI-JING PHILOSOPHY, AND YIN-YANG MODEL:
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION AND TRUTH-CONCERN BASIS

The Yi-Jing philosophy means the philosophical dimension of the resources of thought
delivered and suggested in the Yi-Jing (I Ching) text, which also has its “religious”
1

It is a substantial expansion of the overall-complementarity-seeking methodological account as given
in chapter 4 of Mou 2020 (adding one more complementarity-seeking type besides the previously
examined two major types).
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dimension, its “literature” dimension, etc. It is known that the Yi-Jing text is understood
in its classical or narrow sense and in its broad sense: the former means the ZhouYi 《周易》 text that consists of the sixty-four ideographic symbols, the hexagrams (卦
像 ), and their respective explanatory texts (i.e., gua-ci 卦 辭 and yao-ci 爻 辭 ); in
contrast, the Yi-Jing text in its broad sense consists of the Yi-Jing text in its classical
sense and the subsequent commentary elaborations of the Zhou-Yi text, called the ‘ShiYi’ ( 《 十 翼 》 the Ten Wings), i.e., the Yi-Zhuan ( 《 易 傳 》 ), which are largely
Confucian interpretative elaborations of the Zhou-Yi text. In this chapter, by “the YiJing philosophy”, I primarily mean the Yi-Jing philosophy in its classical sense,
although I will also cite some of the relevant interpretative passages from the Yi-Zhuang
for the sake of illumination in the subsequent discussion. The Yi-Jing philosophy in its
classical sense consists primarily of the yin-yang metaphysical vision, as delivered in
the Yi-Jing text in its classical sense, and its suggested yin-yang methodological model
of how to look at contraries.2
In the following, after a brief introduction to the symbolic system of the Zhou-Yi
text as given (for those readers who are not familiar with this background knowledge),
in view of the major objective of this writing, I give a brief explanations of the yinyang metaphysical vision per se as delivered in the Zhou-Yi text,3 as the main objective
here is to focus on their relations to the yin-yang methodological model as the reflective
elaboration of the yin-yang way of thinking.
In the Yi-Jing system, such ideographical symbols as the trigram and the hexagram
consists of the divided or/and undivided lines, called “yao” (爻) or, as here, “yao-line”:
the divided line “- -”, called “yin-yao,” and undivided lines “—”, called “yang-yao,”
when standing alone, are to stand respectively for the two most basic, mutuallyopposed but interdependent, interpenetrating and complementary forces, i.e., the
yielding force that softly, passively or recessively reveals itself and the hard force that
strongly, actively or manifestly reveals itself, which co-exist in everything of the
universe (i.e., this natural world) in various and distinct ways insofar as each of
particular concrete things has its own distinct identity. The two fundamental types of
forces might be identified, in more or less metaphorical terms, as the yin force and yang
force (respectively ‘yin’ and ‘yang’ for short). The yin-yao and yang-yao combined
together comprise eight trigrams, each of which consists of three yao lines, each of
which is either yin-yao or yang-yao; each of the eight trigrams stands for one
fundamental process or property; they, together with their original interpretations, are
collectively called “八卦” (“Ba-Gua”, the Eight-Trigrams). A hexagram consists of two
of the eight trigrams, respectively as the lower part and the upper part of the hexagram,
and thus consists of six yao lines, each of which is either yin-yao or yang-yao. The
2

For the reference information of the Yi-Jing text in the classical sense and its selected English
translations, see my remarks in the entry “Yi-Jing” in the “References” part. There is the vast literature
on the Yi-Jing text, understood in a broad sense, and its related topic, the Yi-Jing philosophy understood
in a broad sense; with consideration of the focus here, I focus on the methodological resources in the YiJing philosophy and on the research that is directly addressed the yin-yang model in view of the Hegelian
model (primarily, Robert Allinson’s relevant writings 1998 and 2003).
3
For my detailed examination of the yin-yang metaphysical vision in the Yi-Jing text, see Mou 2003.
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lower position has eight choices while the higher position has eight choices, resulting
in sixty-four combinations; there are thus total sixty-four hexagrams respectively in the
sixty-four “gua” ( 卦 ) units, 4 whose characteristic features are related to the two
fundamental processes or properties in the natural world for which the two constituent
trigrams stand respectively. The sixty-four hexagrams are intended to capture the
fundamental way the changing patterns of the natural world are and thus stand for its
sixty-four changing patterns; each of the sixty-four hexagrams is thus intended to stand
for one of the sixty-four changing patterns of the natural world. In the context of the
hexagram (and the trigram), once yang-yao and yin-yao are somehow combined into a
whole to represent some natural thing or changing process, yang-yao or yinyao denotes a (kind of) yang-dominant or yin-dominant changing stage of that thing or
process rather than yang force or yin force alone. That is, each changing stage for
which a yang-yao (or yin-yao) stands is the result of the interaction of the two basic
forces, yang force and yin force. Moreover, each of the hexagrams is somehow
harmoniously related to the others, especially those immediately preceding and
subsequent ones. In this way, in the context of all the hexagrams, it would never be the
case that yang force or yin force is always in a dominant position; a yang-dominant
(or yin-dominant) stage or process would change into a yin-dominant (or yangdominant) stage or process. As a whole, neither yin nor yang could claim its dominant
priority over the other; they are equal in regard to metaphysical status: they are equally
in need in the yin-yang unity as a whole. They are interdependent, interactive, and
complementary to each other in a harmoniously balanced way.
As indicated before, in the Yi system, the sixty-four hexagrams represent sixty-four
changing patterns of our environmental nature, i.e., this actual natural world in the
process of change. According to the Yi-Jing text, any concrete situation and event,
when analyzed into six stages of one pattern of changing process, would share and
illustrate the structure or pattern captured by one of the sixty-four hexagrams whose
meaning is indicated, highlighted and explained by its corresponding explanatory texts,
i.e., gua-ci and yao-ci. In the Yi-Jing text (especially in the yao-ci part), various
exemplars, such as the dragon in the first gua unit (“Qian-Gua”), are used to illustrate
various types of changing processes with their changing patterns and fundamental
characters. As explained before, in a gua unit, a hexagram consists of two of the eight
trigrams, the lower part and the upper part (each of the eight trigrams stands for one
fundamental process or property); their certain combinations via hexagrams stand
for various changing patterns; there are sixty-four changing patterns for which they
4

The basic structure of the gua (卦) unit and its terminology is this. A gua unit (a hexagram and its
original explanatory texts) consists of three parts: (1) the “gua-xiang” (卦像) part: an ideographic symbol
(as a hexagram name) like “ ,” which consists of six divided or/and undivided lines, i.e., yin-yao (陰
爻) or/and yang-yao (陽爻), each of which stands for one of the six stages of the changing pattern
signified by the hexagram; (2) the “gua-ci” (卦辭) part: an explanatory judgment which gives the name
of the gua unit (e.g., “乾” of the first gua unit) and the meaning of the whole gua-xiang (i.e., the whole
hexagram name); (3) the “yao-ci” (爻辭) part: an explanatory judgment on the meaning of each yao line
(a divided or undivided lines) in the context of the hexagram.
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stand; six yao-ci lines (divided and/or undivided lines) of a hexagram, counting from
the bottom line, stand for six stages of a changing pattern. In this way, the Yi system of
sixty-four gua units is set out to capture the fundamental way the natural world is
through capturing its complementary and harmoniously-balanced changing patterns. In
this way, the semantic-truth concern fundamentally underlies the Yi system of sixtyfour gua units, given that semantic notion of truth lies in people’s pre-theoretic “waythings-are-capturing” understanding of truth. The Yi-Jing text thus delivers the
semantic-truth-concern basis for its suggested yin-yang methodological model of how
to look at contraries.
The yin-yang metaphysical vision concerning the relation between changing/
becoming and unchanging/being (as the two most fundamental pair of yin-yang
contraries), as delivered in the Yi-Jing text in the classical sense, constitutes the
metaphysical foundation of the yin-yang model of how to look at contraries. As shown
in the Yi-Jing text, the yin-yang metaphysical vision is neither a mono-simplex as the
changing/becoming-concerned metaphysical perspective alone nor emphasizes
changing/becoming only, but instead is a multi-layered metaphysical vision complex:
(1) the yin-yang metaphysical vision consists of both its perspective dimension and its
guiding-principle dimension; (2) its perspective dimension consists of both the
changing/becoming-concerned perspective and the unchanging/being-concerned
perspective; (3) its guiding-principle dimension consists in a reflective guiding
polymerization of changing/becoming-concerned and unchanging/being-concerned
perspectives which takes neither priority of changing/becoming over unchanging/being
nor priority of unchanging/being over changing/ becoming, but regards changing/
becoming and unchanging/being as fundamentally complementary yin-yang opposites
in harmonious balance in the unified universe.5
1.1.2

CRUCIAL FEATURES OF YIN-YANG MODEL:
SEEKING COMPLEMENTARITY WITHIN UNITY
AND REACHING HARMONIOUS BALANCE

The yin-yang metaphysical vision and the semantic-truth-concern approach as
delivered in the Yi-Jing text have their strong methodological implication and jointly
5

As indicated earlier, I give a detailed analysis of the yin-yang metaphysical vision as delivered in the
Yi-Jing text in Mou 2003 where I explain why one popular or even standard interpretation of the
metaphysical central point of the Yi-Jing text (the Zhou-Yi text) has more or less neglected the
complementary status of being-unchanging aspect and thus of the being-unchanging-aspect-concerned
perspective that is likewise emphasized (instead of the becoming-changing-aspect-concerned
perspective only) in the Yi-Jing text. Among others, the popular English translation of the title of the YiJing text, (The) Book of Changes, as given in its two widely used English translations respectively by
James Legge (published in 1882) and by Cary F. Baynes (translated from Richard Wilhelm’s German
translation, published in 1950), has shown such an orientation, although a more adequate translation, in
my view, would be “the Book of Unity of Changing and Unchanging” which highlights the becomingbeing (changing-unchanging) complementarity, one crucial point of the yin-yang metaphysical vision as
delivered in the Yi-Jing text.
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suggest a yin-yang model of how to look at contraries. The constitution and interaction
between yin and yang as two across-the-board most basic contraries is considered
universal, fundamental, complementary, dynamic, and harmoniously balanced in the
following senses. (1) The yin-yang constitution and interaction are universal in the
sense that yin and yang together with their interaction exist within all things in the
inclusive natural world of which humans are parts. (2) The yin-yang interaction is
fundamental in the sense that their interaction within are considered to be the ultimate
source or pushing force for everything’s becoming-process (forming, developing,
altering, and changing); (3) The yin-yang interaction is complementary in the sense that
yin and yang are not merely co-existing and interdependent but also mutually
supportive and supplementary to each other; they are holistic and united into one thing
within rather than separate without; (4) it is dynamic in the sense that yin and yang are
in changing process and transform into each other, revealing themselves in the
successive stages in the generation of things; (5) it is harmoniously balanced in the
sense that yin and yang seek cooperation and harmonious balance in their interaction.
Among the above characteristic features, two features are crucial: one is
capturing/seeking complementarity; the other is achieving harmonious balance. These
two crucial features as two distinct emphases of the yin-yang model can be well
illustrated by two sample “gua” units in the Yi-Jing text.6
In this way, the yin-yang model of how to look at contraries as one representative
mode of methodological guiding principles concerning how to look at contraries,
generally speaking, emphasize complementarity within unity which features distinct
contraries by their harmonious balance. Now one might raise one reflectively
interesting question this way. On the one hand, indeed, two contraries that are external
to each other in a setting can become internal contraries in a larger setting; for example,
two persons who are from different families but live in a same neighborhood
community can be internal members of this same neighborhood community who
contribute to the identity and harmony of this larger community; thus, in many cases,
6

For example, in the “Qian-Gua” unit, as illustrated by a dragon as an exemplary subject there, when not
ready, the dragon does not rush but lying hidden to well prepare itself (first line from bottom); now when
it is ready, the dragon captures the moment and takes the action (the second line from the bottom); when
creatively acting, it is still alert and careful all way down (the third line); now it takes full action (the
fourth line); the dragon is flying in the sky having achieving its goal (the fifth line from bottom); however,
if the dragon is flying too high exceeding its limit, then it is doomed to suffer setbacks and thus would
repent of its excess; the point here is this: when you are in the high sky feeling so proud, it is also most
dangerous moment, and so be careful and still be modest instead of being arrogant (the sixth line). The
relevant feature and point of the relation between the yin and the yang reflected in this changing pattern
are these: the low and the high are complementary; try to keep them in harmonious balance (so don’t
rush, well prepared when your time has yet come, be careful all way down, etc.). Now let me give a brief
explanation of another sample gua unit (the “Tai-Gua” unit). The name of the eleventh gua unit is “Tai”
meaning peace / unification via interaction. The upper part of its “gua-xiang” the Kun-trigram (standing
for the earth) while the lower part is the Qian-trigram (standing for the heaven); those are not their
supposed positions: the heaven is to be in the upper while the earth the lower; this thus brings about
interactive movement: the lower part is up while the upper part is down (to its supposed position);
through such interaction in a complementary and harmonious way (as illustrated by the situations related
to the six yao lines), the unification is to be achieved.
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we can look at a pair (or group) of contraries in a holistic way (in view of all relevant
aspects and layers of them) and thus treat them as internal contraries within a certain
unity; then we can identify, capture or seek their complementarity as mutual support
and supplementation that is featured by harmonious balance in the setting of such a
unity (with regard to a certain dimension of the unity). However, on the other hand, at
least in some cases, there exist genuine contradictory dimensions of contraries; even
though a pair (group) of contraries with such contradictory dimensions can be still
mutually supportive and supplementary and thus complementary in some way, the
contradictory dimensions of the contraries restrict the range, amount and way in which
their complementarity presents and manifests itself (say, in a recessive, instead of
manifest, way). In the subsequent discussion, to characterize their distinct features and
refine the notion of complementarity, I explicitly distinguish two types of
complementarity: (1) the type of complementarity which shows concordant mutual
support and supplementation within unity in a manifestly harmonious way without
involving contradiction or manifest contradiction (‘concordant complementarity’ for
short); (2) the type of complementarity which is restricted by the contradictory
dimensions of contraries and thus which shows mutual support and supplementation in
a recessive way (‘restrictive complementarity” for short).7 Clearly, the yin-yang model
highlights and emphatically seeks concordant complementarity of contraries as yin and
yang with their harmonious balance. It seems that the yin-yang model has yet to
explicitly address and explain restrictive complementarity.
Indeed, the yin-yang model emphasizes capturing/seeking complementarity,
generally speaking, and especially stresses “concordant” complementarity that features
contraries by their harmonious balance. However, this model per se implies neither that,
generally speaking, it denies the existence of contradiction nor that, specifically
speaking, it rejects other types of complementarity. Actually, the yin-yang model, if
understood in a thorough philosophical way or under appropriate philosophical
interpretation, is not only compatible with but also can constructively work with any
other methodological model that explicitly addresses and effectively explains some
other type of complementarity. The Hegelian methodological model of how to look at
contraries is such a model, to be explained in the next section.
1.2

HEGELIAN METHODOLOGICAL MODEL OF HOW TO LOOK AT
CONTRARIES

My presentation of the Hegelian model below, in contrast to the preceding presentation
of the yin-yang model, is intended to be relatively shorter and concise, minimally
introducing its background and highlighting its relevant key concepts and major
7

Traditionally, complementarity is indiscriminately treated as concordant complementarity without
involving any internal contradiction or self-contradiction but harmony. In his comments on the general
significance of Niels Bohr’s idea of complementarity in physics, Allinson characterizes its key idea this
way: “the core structure of the universe is not perceived of as self-contradictory, but as harmonious with
itself” (Allinson 1998, 507); more generally speaking, he identified a complementarity principle with “a
principle of harmony” (op.cit., 513).
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methodological points in Hegel’s philosophy as presented in his texts, which (say, the
central methodological point of Hegel’s dialectics) are basically the common
knowledge among the scholars in philosophy. The purpose here is to present the
relevant methodological points in Hegel’s philosophy through philosophical
interpretation for the sake of cross-tradition engaging examination of how it is possible
for the yin-yang model to work together with the Hegelian model, rather than giving a
purely historical description of what actually occurred in Hegel’s head based on a
comprehensive analysis of his extensive texts. To this extent, I intentionally label the
model under examination the ‘Hegelian’ model, rather than Hegel’s model. Indeed, a
comprehensive standing-alone comparative case analysis of the yin-yang philosophy
and the Hegelian philosophy deserves a book-length writing. This is not a goal of this
chapter. Some details that are less relevant to the current goal are either briefly
addressed (if any) or omitted, because of the focus of this case analysis and of space
limit. Indeed, the approach taken in this chapter to the comparative study of the yinyang model and the Hegelian model is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. The treatment
here can illustrate one theoretic point made in chapter 3 concerning how philosophical
interpretation and textual analysis are intrinsically related in a project of cross-tradition
philosophical engagement: the detail degree and coverage of a textual analysis of a
target text needs to be sensitive to the purpose and focus of the project, rather than
indiscriminately fitting one fixed pattern.
1.2.1

HEGEL’S DIALECTICAL METHOD: THESIS, ANTITHESIS,
AND SYNTHESIS VIA SUBLATION

Historically speaking, the Hegelian methodological model of how to look at contraries
is suggested in the philosophy of German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) in
the Western philosophical tradition. Hegel introduces a dynamic and essentially
historical perspective into what had hitherto been a supposedly static and timeless
framework for understanding the nature and development of human knowledge
(Mind). 8 Hegel conceives of the world in terms of a contradictory progressive
movement of Mind or Spirit (Geist) towards full self-realization as self-conscious
awareness. Hegel’s doctrine is thus called ‘absolute idealism’, and his methodological
approach ‘Hegel’s dialectics’. The process of Mind is not a simpler linear progression,
but a perpetual dialectical struggle. By the term ‘dialectical’ Hegel refers to a “threestep” movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis whose basic line is this: any given
thesis intrinsically involves some internal contradictions which will generate an
antithesis (the negation of the original thesis). But the interaction and confrontation
between thesis and antithesis in turn leads to fresh tensions or contradictions, thus
bringing about the synthesis of the two, which attempts to resolve the previous
contradictions by “sublation” (Aufhebung) 9 : to preserve or incorporate what are
8

Cf., Hegel 1807 and 1812, among others.
The “thesis-antithesis” dyad originated with Kant 1781 (cf., A417-8/B445-6); the “thesis-antithesissynthesis” triad originated with Fichte 1794/1795 (especially see I: 110-114). in this connection, so to
speak, Hegel’s own distinct contribution lies mainly in his conception of sublation (see Hegel 1807): he

9
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reasonable and valuable in the contraries, thesis and antithesis, into a new and deeper
perspective and discard what are not (negation of the negation).10 But the synthesis will
itself then be subject to further dialectical tension: the process repeats itself in the
struggle toward the truth which is the eventual and distant culmination of an arduous
dialectical process undergone by Mind.
To Hegel, all things in the universe undergo such three-step movement in their
interaction and transformation. For example, consider a seed: take a plant see as a thesis;
then a sprout/plant (antithesis) grows out from the seed (thesis); then the plant produces
the new seed (a sort of synthesis via “sublation”—keep what are positive in both thesis
and antithesis while discarding what is not. In the context of how to treat two seemingly
opposite points of view or philosophies, the Hegelian approach would perceive two
views as coming into a conflict (thesis and antithesis); thereafter, a resolution is derived
via the dialectical process of sublation: two views or two philosophies are at first
perceived as antagonistic to each other or in a collision of opposites; in the dialectical
collision, the resolution is first to jettison what is no longer valuable or reasonable
within the two opposing approaches and then to salvage what is valuable or reasonable;
the final stage is to synthesize what is remaining of the two so as to form a third
viewpoint which contains something valuable of the two precious views but also
transcends either of the previous views or philosophies.
1.2.2

TWO TYPES OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN VIEW OF
THEIR PRE-SUBLATION AND POST-SUBLATION CASES:
A PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION

One philosophically interesting issue concerning the Hegelian model is how to look at
the mutual supportive and supplementary nature and status of the contraries (thesis and
antithesis) before the crucial movement of sublation and that of the contraries after
sublation, i.e., the internal contraries within the synthesis as the new thesis of the next
three-step movement. It is noted that the issue is raised here from the point of view of
philosophical interpretation in two senses: first, the issue is raised for the sake of its
philosophical interest and significance, whether or not Hegel historically really raised
the issue; second, when exploring the issue, we are not restricted to what Hegel’s
textual resources actually said regarding the movement of Mind in his account of
“absolute idealism”: we might further explore the points related to the issue that are
either implied in the relevant textual resources or compatible with these resources for
the sake of the “philosophical-exploration” goal of pursuing “how things are” regarding
the raised issue, instead of the “historical-description” goal of pursuing “how Hegel
thinks things are”.

further develops Fichte’s synthetic method by sublation which not only cancels (as suggested by Fichte)
but preserves (parts of) contradictory thesis and antithesis. Notice that, hardly just employing the “thesisantithesis-synthesis” terminology pattern, Hegel himself used various triad set of terms depending on
contexts (such as the triad terms ‘Being’, ‘Nothing’ and ‘Becoming’ in Hegel 1812, 82-82).
10
Cf., Hegel 1807, §113; 1812, 54, 107.

Comparative Philosophy 13.2 (2022)

MOU

120

Let us first consider the first part of the raised issue: how to look at the mutual
supportive and supplementary nature and status of the contraries (thesis and antithesis)
before the crucial movement of sublation. According to the Hegelian line, generally
speaking, thesis and antithesis are not only co-existent and interdependent but also
make their positive and constructive contributions to the existence and development of
each other and thus to the identity of both as a constructive whole, though both also
have their contradictory dimensions that brings about the tension between them, before
the moment when the further development of the tension brought about by their
respective contradictory dimensions needs sublation. To this extent, thesis and
antithesis at the pre-sublation stage constitute one unity of thesis and antithesis with
their mutual support and supplementation as well as interdependence within the unity,
although the contradictory dimensions of thesis and antithesis renders such mutual
support and supplementation of contraries with manifest contradictory tension
“restrictive” instead of concordant (being restricted by discordant tension) and
“recessive” instead of manifest (showing itself in a receive, rather than manifest, way).
In this sense, as specified at the end of the preceding section, we might as well call such
mutual support and supplementation between contraries ‘restrictive complementarity’:
contraries with such mutual support and supplementation are complementary in
character given that the point of complementary character lies in mutual support and
supplementation, and contraries with such complementarity are restrictive because the
contradictory dimensions of both contraries constitute a kind of restriction on each
other’s identities and development and on their way of manifesting their mutual support
and supplementation. It is important to note that such restrictive character is not just
negative and destructive but can be positive and constructive: the contradictory
dimension of one contrary can positively and constructively restrict on excessive
development of the other contrary when the tension between the contradictory
dimensions of both contraries is in a constructive balance (thus labeled ‘(constructive)
restrictive balance’), although the tension can be somehow out of constructive
restrictive balance and thus need sublation.
Now how about the mutual supportive and supplementary nature and status of
contraries after the crucial movement of synthesis through sublation, i.e., the internal
contraries that are sublated from the previous thesis and antithesis in the previous threestep movement and retained within the new thesis of the current three-step movement?
As stressed above, the question here is raised from the point of view of philosophical
interpretation for the sake of pursuing “how things are” in the natural world of which
humans are, instead of sticking to how Hegel think Mind would move. Thus, a further
evaluative question can be raised this way: how to “objectively” characterize the
relation between these internal contributing elements to the new thesis in the “waythings-are-capturing” sense of ‘objective’, if the goal here is not to give a purely
historical description of Hegel’s own account but to examine how the interaction and
transformation of contraries in the new thesis after sublation go in the natural world?
So to speaking, the complementarity between these reasonable and valuable elements
that are sublated respectively from the two contraries, previous thesis and antithesis,
and incorporated into a new unity can be mutually supportive and supplementary in

Comparative Philosophy 13.2 (2022)

MOU

121

one of two alternative ways: either in a way of manifestly “concordant” or “harmonious
balance between those internal distinct but concordant elements within the new thesis
(thus as concordant complementarity), or in a way of “restrictive” balance between the
manifestly contradictory elements within the new thesis (thus as restrictive
complementarity). To Hegel, the latter case is the only alternative because of the
throughout contradictory process of contraries without exception. However, when we
look at the real-life case, the former case is possible (at least before one internal element
of the new thesis that is recessively contradictory if any would subsequently develop
into the antithesis): either because the agent can explicitly add “concordant
complementarity without manifest contradiction between the elements resulting from
sublation” as one contributing expectation for sublation even if it is a required one,
although it seems that Hegel at least did not explicitly make this expectation for
sublation, or because it might happen to be case that these elements resulting from
sublation are concordant in their harmonious balance. In the former case, there are
several characteristic features: (1) these retained elements in the new thesis as a whole
are in co-operation and harmonious balance that fundamentally contributes to the very
identity of the new thesis; (2) though there might be internal elements that are
recessively contradictory, the tension has yet to develop to the extent to which the new
antithesis is explicitly and fully formed up; in other words, the “concordant
complementarity” dimension of the new thesis is still in a dominant status, while the
“contradiction” dimension has yet to develop to the extent to which the new antithesis
is explicitly formed up; (3) the constructive development of the new thesis at its initial
post-sublation stage shows that the internal contributing elements within the new thesis
are still mutually supportive and supplementary in a dominant and manifest way.
Indeed, it might be the case that, at the very initial stage of the development of the
new three-step movement, the complementarity of contraries within the new thesis is
concordant complementarity and then, when the antithesis is developed from the thesis,
the complementarity between thesis and antithesis (before further sublation if any is in
need) would become restrictive complementarity.
In this way, through its conceptual and explanatory resources concerning the
foregoing three-step movement of contraries, the Hegelian account under the foregoing
philosophical interpretation can explicitly recognize and emphasize the distinct kinds
of internal interactions which possess distinct types of complementarity as follows,
although Hegel’s texts per se did not explicitly or formally use the ‘complementarity’
terminology and its associated lexical distinction between different kinds of
complementarity. These distinct types of complementarity are these: (1) restrictive
complementarity between thesis and antithesis within the pre-sublation thesisantithesis unity; (2) restrictive complementarity between those internal contributing
elements within the post-sublation thesis that are synthesized via sublation from the
previous thesis and antithesis; (3) concordant/harmonious complementarity between
those internal contributing elements within the post-sublation thesis that are
synthesized via sublation from the previous thesis and antithesis. The Hegelian account
can also explain how it is possible for these distinct kinds of internal interactions
through synthesis via sublation to transform toward further development. In my view,
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these are important contributions that the Hegelian model has made to our
understanding and treatment of how to look at contraries. These are also substantial
connections in which the yin-yang model can work together with the Hegelian model,
to be explained in the next subsection.
1.3

HOW IT IS POSSIBLE FOR YIN-YANG MODEL TO
WORK TOGETHER WITH HEGELIAN MODEL:
AN OVERALL-COMPLEMENTARITY-SEEKING ACCOUNT

It is philosophically interesting and engaging to see how the yin-yang model and the
Hegelian model can jointly contribute to our understanding and treatment of the
reflective issue of how to look at the due relation between contraries or conflicting
parties. 11 The two models share some common points while having distinctions
regarding focus and emphasis. Both models highlight the universal existence of two
correlative contraries, yin and yang or thesis and antithesis; both emphasize that the
relations between the contraries are interdependent and interactional; both render the
interactional relation fundamental in the sense that the interaction of the two contraries
constitutes the ultimate source and final pushing force for the transformation and
development of all things in the universe; as far as the interdependent relation is
concerned, both consider the interdependent relation dynamic rather than static; as far
as the dynamic development is concerned, both stress reaching a kind of (dynamic)
balance. However, on the other hand, there are some interesting distinctions in regard
to focus and emphasis.
As far as their emphasis on the interaction between the contraries is concerned,
roughly speaking (at this point for the heuristic consideration), the yin-yang way
emphasizes cooperation within, while the Hegelian dialectical way stresses opposition
without; insofar as both emphasize balance, the yin-yang way endeavors to reach
harmony within the yin-yang unity through concordant complementarity, while the
Hegelian way endeavors to reach synthesis without or beyond thesis-antithesis through
sublation. At this moment, one might ask: “Which model is to be followed?” or “Which
model is better?” The question per se might be misleading if the question presupposes
that there be absolutely one absolutely better model. However, the question as
presented in that way is not necessarily misleading as the question is not asking “Which
model is absolutely or indiscriminately better/superior?” We can see this: given a
certain specific “conflict” situation, one model is more adequate and better than the
other. The point is this: depending on the distinct nature of the conflict under
examination, one can choose one of the two models that would better respond to the
conflict nature to better treat it. A more challenging question is this: can we apply the
two models to the same case at the same time? That is, when treating one case/situation,
can we simultaneously apply both models? One crucial point is this: if an object of
11

For a thoughtful comparative examination of the yin-yang model and the Hegelian model in view of
Buddhist transformational model, see Allinson 2003. The interested reader can compare and contrast
Allinson’s account to this author’s account as suggested in this chapter, although it is not done here due
to the goal of this chapter in the book and space limit.
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study has two distinct aspects that demand respectively for the two models, we can
apply both models to the same object simultaneously.
With the foregoing examination of the yin-yang and the Hegelian model, and with
consideration that the metaphysical foundation and the truth-concern basis associated
with the yin-yang model does matter for the goal of cross-tradition engagement as
addressed in this book, a philosophically interesting yet engaging question is how it is
possible for the yin-yang model with its normative metaphysical foundation and truthconcern basis (fundamentally in accordance with the “this-natural-world-wholerecognizing” norm and the “way-things-are-capturing” norm as explained in chapter 1)
to work together with the Hegelian model. The question is philosophically interesting
because their distinct account can jointly make substantial contributions to our
understanding and treatment of the significant jointly concerned reflective issue of how
to look at the due relation between contraries; it is engaging because their distinct
accounts give different stories that seem to be opposed to each other in significant
connections.
In the following, when exploring this philosophically interesting and engaging
meta-methodological question, I intend to give an overall-complementarity-seeking
account of how to look at the due relation between contraries. My strategy is this. In
view of the foregoing general characterization of the shared common points between
the two models and their distinct points and emphases in treating the issue of how to
look contraries in their treating the interaction and transformation of contraries in the
natural world, I present a set of the general “adequacy” conditions for how to
adequately bridge contraries; to be sensitive to distinct identities of different types of
contraries, and for the sake of keeping the prospective explanatory potency and
widespread coverage, I present these across-the-board adequacy conditions in the
“schemas” form, which however are neither claimed to be exhaustive nor rendered
exclusive but open to be further modified, criticized, revised and/or expanded by any
interested reader as well as by this author. Two notes are due at this point. First, by
‘overall complementarity’ in the phrase ‘an overall-complementarity-seeking account’,
I mean an inclusive, pluralist notion of complementarity which is to cover distinct types
of complementarity in an inclusively disjunctive way (“either…or…” but possibly
“…and…”). Second, in a given unity or situation, the relevant contributing contraries
might be more than two; however, both for the theoretic sake12 and for the practical
convenience, ‘contraries’ is assumed to be two contraries as a primary pair of contraries
in the following schemas of the addressed adequacy conditions.
(1) The adequacy condition (schema) of capturing concordant complementarity
between contraries within their unity, under which to adequately look at
contraries’ concordant-complementarity relation (if any) [‘the concordantcomplementarity-seeking condition (schema)’ for short].

12

That is, one can always identify one primary pair of contraries in a given stage of process of interaction
and transformation, in line with both models in this connection.
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Given that two seemingly competing contraries turn out to be somehow (directly or
manifestly, maybe in a dynamic way) mutually supportive and supplementary and thus
concordantly complementary to each other within the unity of these contraries and that
the raison d’être of the unity as part of the natural world is in accordance with the
fundamental way of the natural world, a methodological guiding principle is considered
adequate (in this connection) if it guides the agent to capture concordant/harmonious
complementarity between these contraries within their unity and/or understand such
concordant/harmonious complementarity. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in
this connection) if otherwise.
In this case, the harmonious contraries under examination are mutually supportive
in a manifest way (manifestly making joint contribution to the constructive raison
d’être of the unity). The yin-yang model emphasizes seeking concordant or harmonious
complementarity between contraries. Many cases well illustrate concordant
complementarity between contraries.13
(2) The adequacy condition (schema) of capturing restrictive complementarity
between contradictory contraries within their unity, under which to adequately
look at contradictory contraries’ restrictive complementarity (if any) [‘the
restrictive-complementarity-seeking condition (schema)’ for short].
Given that two contraries turn out to be genuinely “contradictory” [continuously or
temporarily at some stage(s) of their development] but make joint contribution to the
complete identity of their unity as a whole (thus being somehow (maybe in a dynamic
way) mutually supportive or supplementary, though being restricted by their
contradictory dimensions) and that the raison d’être of the unity as part of the natural
world is constructive in the sense that it exists in accordance with the fundamental way
of the natural world, a methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this
connection) if it guides the agent to capture restrictive complementarity between these
contradictory contraries within their unity and/or understand such restrictive
complementarity. In contrast, it is considered inadequate. In contrast, it is considered
inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise.
In this case, the contradictory contraries under examination are mutually supportive
in a recessive way (recessively making joint contribution to the constructive raison
d’être of the unity) but are restricted by their contradictory dimensions. The Hegelian
model’s account of thesis and antithesis as pro-sublation contraries within their presublation unity points to restrictive complementarity between them.
In contrast to the previous case of seeking concordant or harmonious
13

For example, Socrates’ “universal aspect concerned” perspective and Confucius’ “situation aspect
concerned” perspective in treating their jointly concerned issue of (filial) piety, to be explained in chapter
5, are concordantly complementary in a manifest way. (For this author’s detailed analysis of this case,
see Mou 2020, chapter 5.) For another example, Aristotle’s “essence-aspect-capturing” perspective (as
the “perspective” dimension of his approach as a whole) and Cook Ding’s “pack-of-fresh-bone-aspectcapturing” perspective, as cited by Zhuang Zi, in treating the jointly concerned issue of identities of
things. (For this author’s detailed analysis of this case, see Mou 2020, section 6.2.3 of chapter 6.)
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complementarity, this case might be a bit harder for understanding, which I intend to
give more explanation. Let me first illustrate the case via (one type of) examples with
which most of us might have our first-hand experience. One as a normal human being
would often undergo the internal conflict of emotion (being emotional) and rationality
(or being rational understood in a broader sense of ‘rational’ or ‘rationality’ than mere
inter-subjective rationality) when treating some of specific issues in one’s life. In some
cases, they (being emotional and being rational) are genuinely contradictory (thus in
“dilemma” situations) but both per se constructively contribute to one’s identity as a
whole: when one treats a certain hard situation, one needs both in a non-excessive way
instead of totally discarding either one. In some cases, when one rationally treats them
(say, at one’s behavior level), one still keeps being emotional (say, at the level of one’s
deep heart); in some other cases, when one emotionally takes care of them manifestly
via external action and attitude, one still needs to be rational (say, at the level of one’s
calm mind); in still some other cases, one needs to be both emotional and rational even
at one’s manifest behavior and attitude level. In all these cases, the point is that being
emotional and being rational in a non-excessive way are both in need in distinct ways
regarding these distinct situations, instead of absolutely and indiscriminately discarding
either one.
Generally speaking, restrictive complementarity between two contradictory
contraries, given the constructive raison d’être of their unity as a whole, lies in not
merely their co-existence and interdependence but also in this: on the one hand, the two
contradictory contraries constructively make joint contribution to the complete identity
of their unity as a whole (through their mutual support and supplementation in this
connection); on the other hand, they jointly plays a constructive role of mutual
restriction on excessive development of each other (say, when the emotional becomes
too much emotional or of over-emotional impulse, or when the rational becomes too
much or excessively-rational); they are thus “restrictively” complementary: although
they might be apparently non-concordant, they are eventually mutually supportive in a
recessive way and their contradictory and restrictive existence within their unity
contribute to each other’s healthy and non-excessive existence and development.
(3) The adequacy condition (schema) of seeking sublation and post-sublation
complementarity between new contraries “sublated” from original contraries,
under which to adequately look at the due relations between pre-sublation
contraries and between post-sublation contraries [‘the post-sublationcomplementarity-seeking condition (schema)’ for short].
Given that two seemingly competing contraries as a whole somehow cannot be
mutually supportive and supplementary (neither in a manifest way nor in a recessive
way) and need their sublation (understood broadly, to be explained below) so that
reasonable and valuable elements that are sublated respectively from the two contraries
and incorporated into a new unity can be mutually supportive and supplementary
(either in a manifest way or in a recessively way), a methodological guiding principle
is considered adequate if it guides the agent to sublate these reasonable and valuable
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elements from the two original contraries, incorporates them into a new unity as new
contraries and thus brings about their complementarity and/or understand such
sublation and post-sublation complementarity. In contrast, it is considered inadequate
(in this connection) if otherwise.
Two notes are due here regarding the post-sublation-complementarity-seeking
condition schema. First, the addressed “sublation need” needs to be understood broadly:
it can cover the need for sublation of two contraries in social reality when the raison
d’être of the their unity as a whole is not constructive anymore to the extent that the
existence of either one of the contraries or both is not constructive in view of (various
manifestations of) the fundamental way of the natural world of which humans and the
human society are parts; it also can cover the need for sublation of two contraries in the
natural environment when they naturally develop into the stage of synthesis via
sublation. For example, there might be two seemingly competing guiding-principleassociated perspective complexes as two approaches to building up a social-economic
community: the profit-seeking-only perspective complex (i.e., the profit-seeking
perspective that is associated with a guiding principle which renders this perspective
exclusively eligible) and the welfare-seeking-only perspective (i.e., the welfareseeking perspective that is associated with a guiding principle which renders this
perspective exclusively eligible). It is arguably the case that a constructive and healthy
social-economic community does or should have both its profit-seeking layer and its
welfare-seeking layer for the sake of its well-being, instead of having one only. In this
case, what really makes the two perspective complexes competing or incompatible
would be their respectively associated guiding principles that render their respectively
guided perspectives exclusively eligible. Then, when a methodological guiding
principle seeks a synthetic balance (via sublation) to bring about a new approach that
sublates what are reasonable and valuable from the two perspective complexes (i.e., the
two involved perspective simplexes per se) while disregarding what are not (i.e., the
two involved inadequate guiding principles) and seeks their complementarity in the
new approach, the methodological guiding principle would be considered to be
adequate because it meets the sublation-seeking condition in this case.
Second, the addressed post-sublation complementarity can be mutual support and
supplementation in a manifest way or in a recessive way. As far as the result of
sublation is concerned, (3) might be the same as (1), reaching concordant
complementarity of manifest mutual support, which is between harmonious contraries
within the original unity in the case (1) and would be between the newly identified
harmonious contraries within the post-sublation unity. Similarly, as far as the result of
sublation is concerned, (3) might be the same as (2), reaching restrictive
complementarity of recessive mutual support, which is between contradictory
contraries within the original unity in the case (2) and would be between the newly
identified contradictory contraries within the post-sublation unity. In this way, meeting
the adequacy conditions (1), (2) and (3) are inclusively (rather than exclusive)
disjunctive.
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(4) The adequacy condition (schema) of seeking critical-reflection-generating
complementarity between one contrary that contains some reasonable and
valuable element(s) (either its “perspective” dimension including some
“eligible” perspective or its “guiding-principle” dimension including some
“adequate” guiding-principle element) and another contrary that would include
neither eligible perspective nor adequate guiding principle, under which to
adequately treat their relation still in a constructively complementary way that
would generate critical reflections on why the latter is mistaken and
unconstructive (including neither eligible perspective nor adequate guiding
principle) on how to learn from the latter’s mistakes and lessons [‘the criticalreflection-generated-complementarity-seeking condition (schema)’ for short].
Given that two contraries turn out to be that one contrary contains some reasonable
and valuable element(s) (in the case of mental ideological contraries, one contrary
includes either some “eligible” perspective in its “perspective” dimension or some
“adequate” guiding-principle element in its “guiding-principle” dimension), and the
other contrary that includes neither eligible perspective nor adequate guiding principle,
although there would be some raison d’être of the latter contrary (whether or not the
latter contrary as part of the natural world is in accordance with the fundamental way
of the natural world), a methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in
this connection) if it guides the agent [either, if the addressed contraries are non-mental
ones in the world, the agent who look at them or the agent who holds one of the mental
ideological contraries] to generate critical but constructive reflections on why the latter
contrary can occur and how it can be overcome and avoid in the future (in plain words,
through critical reflection, the agent can learn from the involved parties’ mistakes and
lessons related to the latter contrary. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this
connection) if otherwise. In this way, even the case of an extreme approach that would
include neither eligible perspective nor adequate guiding principle can be still treated
in a constructively complementary way.14
In so doing, one is expected to <1> maintain already-achieved complementarity
(either already achieved or in the achieving process) by alerting to and overcoming
(possible) excessiveness and <2> keep a thorough open-minded and self-criticism
14

The fourth “adequacy” condition (type) presented here is a newly added for another type of
complementarity seeking, whose initial idea is briefly presented in Mou 2021. Though these distinct
types of complementarity are conceptually distinct and can be pursued separately, they might be jointly
pursued in a specific project in treating contraries in tension or conflict. For example, given the
distinction between methodological perspectives (eligible vs ineligible ones) and methodological
guiding principles (adequate vs inadequate ones), concordant-complementarity seeking can be focused
on in treating distinct eligible and consistent perspective respectively from different approaches; in
contrast, both pre-sublation restrictive complementarity and post-sublation concordant complementarity
can be jointly sought in treating distinct eligible but contradictory perspectives respectively from
different approaches at the pre-sublation stage and in treating those eligible and consistent perspectives
(newly generated from sublation) at the post-sublation stage. Furthermore, whenever there are ineligible
perspective(s) and/or inadequate guiding principle(s) involved in either of different approaches, criticalreflection-generated complementarity can be sought.
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attitude towards one’s own approach (instead of being blindly based on faith or
authority). Such further theoretic elaboration might as well be called an ‘overallcomplementarity-seeking’ account.
(5) The adequacy condition (type) of maintaining already-achieved
complementarity (if in need) by overcoming what is excessive (if any) and
supplementing what is insufficient (if any) in the development of contraries
within their unity, under which to adequately look at the due relation between
contraries in a non-excessive way and have them in constructive and balanced
development [‘the excessiveness-overcoming condition (schema)’ for short].
Given that two seemingly competing contraries turn out to be complementary (either
in manifest way or in a recessive way) within the unity of these contraries and that the
raison d’être of the unity as part of the natural world is still constructive in the sense
that it exists in accordance with the fundamental way of the natural world, a
methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it guide
the agent to capture and maintain complementarity between these contraries through
overcoming what is excessive (if any) and supplementing what is insufficient (if any)
in the development process of contraries within their unity. In contrast, it is considered
inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise.
There are two notes regarding the nature of the excessiveness-overcoming
condition schema. First, in one sense we can say the previous adequacy condition
schemas concerning seeking complementarity implies this adequacy condition schema,
as complementarity of contraries implies their non-excessive states; however, as
contraries are in dynamic change and development, the already-achieved
complementarity of contraries resulting from complementarity-seeking efforts and/or
being captured by the previous reflective examination might be damaged or even lost
by the excessive development (if any) of one or both of the contraries. To this extent,
there is the reflective need to stress continuously maintaining the already-achieved
complementarity and alerting the danger of excessive development of one or both of
the contraries, unless there is a genuine need for sublation (say, when the raison d’être
of the unity of the contraries is not constructive anymore).
Second, complementarity is a kind of balance against excessiveness; I have
emphatically addressed two types of complementarity, concordant or harmonious
complementarity and restrictive complementarity, and thus two types of balance,
harmonious balance between concordant contraries and restrictive balance between
contradictory contraries. When the yin-yang model emphasizes seeking and
maintaining concordant complementarity and thus harmonious balance, it also stresses
overcoming excessiveness. This is one significant point of the yin-yang model.
However, on the other hand, this emphasis does not automatically include the emphasis
on seeking and maintaining restrictive complementarity and thus restrictive balance
against overcoming excessiveness in this connection. In this way, the excessivenessovercoming condition schema as a whole is to substantially enhance the yin-yang
model through also stressing overcoming excessiveness in this connection; to this
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extent, it is worth singling out as a separate adequacy condition schema in this yinyang-model-based overall-complementarity-seeking account of how to look at the due
relation between contraries.
With the foregoing examination and explanation, the following points can be
highlighted as follows:
(1) There are three distinct main types of complementarity to be sought that point
respectively to three representative types of contrary cases:
(A) Seeking concordant (harmonious) complementarity (between those contraries
that can harmoniously work together), as shown in the Yin-Yang model of how to look
at contraries and as captured by the adequacy condition of capturing concordant
complementarity between contraries within their unity [i.e., the concordantcomplementarity-seeking condition (1)].
(B) Seeking restrictive complementarity (between those contradictory contraries
that might result in or from sublation), as shown in the Hegelian model of how to look
at contraries and as captured jointly by the adequacy condition of capturing restrictive
complementarity between contradictory contraries within their unity [‘the restrictivecomplementarity-seeking condition (2)] and the adequacy condition of seeking
sublation and post-sublation complementarity between new contraries “sublated”
from original contraries [‘the post-sublation-complementarity-seeking condition (3)].
(C) Seeking critical-reflection-generated complementarity (when facing a contrary
that includes neither eligible perspective nor adequate guiding principle), as captured
by the adequacy condition of seeking critical-reflection-generated complementarity
between one contrary that contains some reasonable and valuable element(s) (either
its “perspective” dimension including some “eligible” perspective or its “guidingprinciple” dimension including some “adequate” guiding-principle element) and
another contrary that would include neither eligible perspective nor adequate guiding
principle, under which to adequately treat their relation still in a constructively
complementary way that would generate critical reflections on why the latter is
mistaken and unconstructive and on how to learn from the latter’s mistakes and lessons
[‘the critical-reflection-generated-complementarity-seeking condition (4)].
(2) In so doing, one is expected to <1> maintain already-achieved complementarity
by alerting to and overcoming (possible) excessiveness and <2> keep a thorough openminded and self-criticism attitude towards one’s own approach (instead of being blindly
based on faith or authority). This point is captured by the adequacy condition (type) of
maintaining already-achieved complementarity (if in need) by overcoming what is
excessive (if any) and supplementing what is insufficient (if any) in the development
of contraries within their unity, under which to adequately look at the due relation
between contraries in a non-excessive way and have them in constructive and balanced
development [‘the excessiveness-overcoming condition (5)].
(3) An overall-complementarity-seeking account is intended to capture the
foregoing three distinct main types of complementarity-seeking approaches in a holistic
way, which points respectively three representative types of contrary cases, while
alerting to and overcoming (possible) excessiveness and keeping a thorough openminded and self-criticism attitude. In this way, the addressed overall-complementarity-
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seeking account includes a harmonious-complementarity-seeking perspective in its
“perspective” dimension but transcends a harmonious-complementarity-seeking
perspective through the guidance of the addressed “adequacy conditions (types)” in its
“guiding-principle” dimension.
It is noted that the suggested overall-complementarity-seeking account in terms of
the foregoing across-the-board adequacy condition schemas for how to adequately look
at the due relationship between contraries is presented as a general account concerning
various distinct types of contraries in this natural world (understood broadly) of which
humans with their associated things are parts: such distinct types of contraries include
non-human-mental contraries in the physical world and human-mental contraries; the
latter includes distinct individual humans, human social groups or human communities
as “contraries” and distinct ideological approaches or methodological perspectives (to
a jointly concerned reflective issue) as “contraries”. When this general account is
applied to a specific type of contraries [among others, distinct (eligible) perspectives in
people’s philosophical or other intellectual pursuits of “how things are” with one shared
strategic goal of truth pursuit], there are two more needs: first, to refine and elaborate
the contents of the manifestations of foregoing adequacy condition schemas in treating
this type of contraries; second, to supplement additional adequacy conditions in need,
being sensitive to distinct features of this types of contraries. In the “conclusion”
chapter of Mou 2020, I suggest and explain a set of eleven “adequacy” conditions, as
a core part of the suggested “constructive-engagement” meta-methodological
framework, for how to maintain adequate methodological guiding principles and thus
how to adequately look at the due relationship between distinct perspectives in treating
an jointly talked about object of study in philosophy, generally speaking, and an jointlyconcerned issue in cross-tradition philosophical engagement, specially speaking. This
is a more comprehensive “constructive-engagement” meta-methodological framework
of how to look at distinct methodological perspectives as contraries. This
comprehensive account of how to adequately look at distinct perspectives includes not
only the adequacy conditions that are directly about seeking overall complementarity
between two (or more than two) distinct (eligible) perspectives, which actually
implement and manifest four of the five adequacy condition schemas presented here
[i.e., the foregoing adequacy condition schemas (1), (2), (3) and (5) regarding seeking
overall complementarity]; it also includes a range of additional adequacy conditions
concerning the “adequacy” of how to adequately look at the relation between various
relevant eligible perspectives in other connections than (or surrounding) the foregoing
overall-complementarity-seeking connections. At the meta-methodological level,
besides these adequacy conditions that directly involve seeking overall
complementarity, there are the adequacy condition of recognizing the same object as a
whole, the adequacy condition of recognizing perspective eligibility, the adequacy
condition of being sensitive to the agent purpose, the adequacy condition of granting
equality status, the adequacy condition of recognizing new eligible perspectives, the
adequacy condition of being sensitive to dynamic development of an object of study
and thus the due coverage of eligible perspectives. At the meta-meta-methodological
level regarding how to look at the due relationship between the foregoing distinct meta-
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methodological adequacy conditions, there is the adequacy condition of holding a
thorough open-minded and self-critical attitude towards the agent’s own approach.
dimension.
In this comprehensive account of how to adequately look at the due relationship
between distinct perspectives in treating an jointly-talked-about object of study in
philosophy, generally speaking, and an jointly-concerned issue in cross-tradition
philosophical engagement, specially speaking, let me say a bit more about the adequacy
condition of recognizing the same object as a whole (‘the same-object-wholerecognizing condition’ for short) which is this: a methodological guiding principle is
considered adequate (in this connection) if, given an object (as a whole) of study, it
enables the agent to recognize that there is a way that the object objectively is such that
people can all talk about that same object as a whole even though they may say different
things about the object (concerning its distinct aspects), neither resulting in “anything
goes” nor thus bringing about radically different objects on their own. In contrast, it is
considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. This adequacy condition are
intrinsically related to the two normative bases for cross-tradition engagement: <1> this
adequacy condition actually is one significant variant of the “same-object-wholerecognizing” norm in addressing how to adequately look at distinct approaches; for <2>
due to the intrinsic connection between the “same-object-whole-recognizing” norm and
the “way-things-are-capturing” norm,15 this adequacy condition may be also called the
“way-things-are-capturing” condition. As for the relation between this adequacy
condition and the other meta-methodological adequacy conditions, this adequacy
condition is the most basic in two senses: first, all the other adequacy conditions
presuppose that people can all talk about that same object as a whole even though they
may say different things about it, instead of thus bringing about different objects on
their own; second, it is also presupposed by the remaining adequacy conditions for the
sake of capturing the way the object is (or is to be), given that the truth pursuit (i.e., the
“way-things-are-capturing” pursuit) is one strategic goal for any reflective pursuits of
“how things are” (instead of “anything goes” or “mere intellectual game playing”).
2. A COMMENTARY ON CHENYANG LI’S CONFUCIAN
HARMONY-SEEKING ACCOUNT
If my understanding is correct, Chenyang Li’s whole account, which is labeled ‘the
Confucian philosophy of Harmony’ (Li 2014) and is also labeled ‘harmony as a virtue
in Confucianism’ with more focus on harmony as a virtue (Li & Düring 2022,
forthcoming; ‘Li 2022’ for short below), actually consists of two portions: <1> its
substantial portion as one explicitly given approach in social-political philosophy to the
issue of what counts as one primary social-political ideal regarding social relationship
between individual humans, social groups, and communities; <2> its methodological
portion (or its methodological implication) on how to look at contraries. To this extent,
15

For this author’s detailed explanation of their intrinsic connection, see Mou 2020, chapter 1, section
1.3.
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Li’s work as a whole (2014 and 2022) is a significant work primarily in the areas of
social-political and moral philosophy while related to the issue of philosophical
methodology to the extent to be addressed below. As for <1>, the addressed harmonyseeking approach is originally presented in Li 2014 (primarily based on relevant
resources from Confucianism) as one significant approach in social-political
philosophy “for guidance in dealing with creative tension between Confucianism and
democracy” (Li 2014, xiv). As for <2>, the addressed harmony-seeking
methodological approach to tensions and conflicts is not limited to treating social
relationship between contraries as the human agents and human groups but also
“applicable to all things in the world, including human affairs” (Li 2022).
In this commentary, in view of the topic and emphasis of this “constructiveengagement dialogue” section, I focus on the methodological portion of Li’s Confucian
harmony-seeking account concerning how to look at contraries (it might be as well
called ‘Li’s Confucian harmony-seeking methodological approach to the issue of how
to look at contraries’), rather than its substantial portion on harmony as a substantial
social-political ideal: “harmony is a desirable goal of human pursuit…for human
flourishing…and how human beings ought to act” (Li 2014, 10). With this focus, in my
commentary, I suspend and do not include my evaluative remarks on its socialpolitical-approach portion (harmony as a prescriptive social ideal concerning the social
relationship between distinct human beings and different social human groups/
communities), although I would largely endorse Li’s thoughts on this issue in the area
of social-political philosophy.
As far as the structure and content of Li’s harmony-seeking methodological
approach are concerned, in my opinion, it consists of its “perspective” dimension and
its “guiding-principle” dimension, in terms of the conceptual and explanatory resources
that are introduced in “Appendix” for the sake of clear presentation and refined
understanding.16 Its “perspective” dimension lies in a harmonious-complementarityseeking perspective per se, which is presented via the cited quotations of an ancient
minister-scholar Yan Ying 晏 嬰 (578-500 BC), who gives a plain-word
characterization of harmonious complementarity in terms of dish cooking and music
making metaphors (Li 2022, 2-3), and also explained in terms of “heterogeneity,
tension, coordination and cooperation, transformation and growth, and renewal” (Li
2014, 9-10); as one methodological way, it itself is neutral to some extent17 and is
appliable in different substantial situations (say, in dish cooking, or in music making,
or in a theoretic setting). There is one “identifying” feature of harmoniously
complementary contraries: though via internal coordination, they would not lose their
“core” identities (without “negating one other”), even if in dynamic changing process
with addressed “transformation, growth and renewal” (also cf., Zhang Dainian’s
characterization in Zhang 1988, which the author cites in Li 2020, 171), in contrast to
16

For the distinction between two methodological things, the methodological perspective and the
methodological guiding principle together with their associated lexical distinctions, see the relevant
explanation in “Appendix”.
17
Whether a methodological perspective in a certain case of contraries is “eligible” or “ineligible” would
be sensitive to the nature and status of the contraries under examination.
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the case of restrictively-complementary contraries as captured by the Hegelian model
(internal contradictory elements in thesis and anti-thesis can develop to the stage of
negating one other thought sublation).
Its “guiding-principle” dimension regarding how to regulate and guide the holder
of the approach: <i> to evaluate the status of its perspective dimension (i.e., the
harmonious-complementarity-seeking methodological perspective per se); <ii> to
evaluate how its advocated harmony-seeking or harmonious-complementarity-seeking
methodological perspective is related to other methodological perspectives (i.e., some
other types of complementarity-seeking perspectives if any); <iii> to understand its
metaphysical basis or philosophical nature, among others. If my understanding is
correct, Li does explicitly say something regarding <iii> which is “Confucian” in
nature (which is partially controversial, to be addressed below), explicitly say
something regarding <i> (to the extent: advocating/ emphasizing the harmony-seeking
methodological perspective but, fairly speaking, having yet to explicitly treat it as the
exclusive and exhaustive one, though one might say that Li’s sayings appear to imply
that), and has yet to be explicitly and clearly on <ii> (whether there are other types of
complementarity-seeking than harmonious-complementarity-seeking and how they
would be related to each other). In the above sense, the methodological portion of Li’s
account has yet to be complete: at the level of its methodological “perspective”
dimension, only the harmony-seeking methodological perspective is explicitly
presented given that there are other types of complementarity-seeking perspectives; at
the level of its methodological “guiding-principle” dimension, the evaluation regarding
<ii> has yet to be given, and it would be partially controversial regarding its view on
<iii>.
On the one hand, the addressed harmonious-complementarity-seeking perspective
per se (on the “perspective” dimension of Li’s harmony-seeking methodological
approach), in my view, is not exclusively “Confucian” in nature and thus should not be
rendered “Confucian” (as explained above, the method itself is neutral and can be
applied either in a theoretic setting or in a folk context such as dish cooking and music
making), because the addressed harmonious-complementarity-seeking perspective per
se is suggested in the original Yi-Jing text in the classical sense, the Zhou-Yi text
(different from the Yi-Jing text in the broad sense which also includes the subsequent
largely Confucian interpretative commentary, the Yi-Zhuang text), which is not shared
by Confucianism alone but also shared by all other major movements of thought in the
classical Chinese philosophy – among others, philosophical Daoism (e.g., see the
methodological point of chapter 77 of the Dao-De-Jing). It is noted that the addressed
distinction between “active harmony” and “passive harmony” (Li 2022, 3-4) is more
substantial about certain distinct social-political ideals than methodological.
On the other hand, indeed, some components on its “guiding-principle” dimension
can be rendered “Confucian”. So, if the nature of Li’s harmony-seeking methodological
approach as a whole is determined at least partially by the nature of its “guidingprinciple” dimension, Li’s harmony-seeking methodological approach as a whole can
be rendered “Confucian” in view of the nature of its “guiding-principle” dimension.
For example, the Confucian interpretative commentary treats the metaphysical
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orientation regarding the relation between the “changing” and the “unchanging” (the
two most basic pair of yin and yang forces in this natural world) as the (absolute)
priority of changing over the unchanging; in my view, this Confucian understanding of
the basic metaphysical vision of the Yi-Jing text in the classical sense does not capture
of the genuine point of the yin-yang metaphysical vision as delivered in the Yi-Jing text
in the classical sense; rather, as explained in Mou 2003, the basic metaphysical vision
of the Yi-Jing text in the classical sense treats the fundamental relationship between the
changing and the unchanging as one most fundamental pair of “yin” and “yang” forces
that are fundamentally complementary to each other: neither of them has (absolute)
priority over the other. [In this sense, the more adequate English translation of the YiJing text in the classical sense is ‘The Book of Unity of Changing and Unchanging’
(instead of its widely circulated English title ‘The Book of Changes’). It is also noted
that the Chinese character ‘yi’ in the context of the Zhou-Yi text has three closely related
meanings: “changing”, “unchanging”, and “easy”, instead of “changing” only.] In this
sense, and to this extent, the addressed Confucian understanding of the metaphysical
orientation of the priority of the changing over the unchanging actually constitutes one
guiding-principle component, which is at least controversial or might be rendered
“inadequate” (regarding how to understanding the metaphysical basis of the addressed
harmony-seeking methodological perspective) in the guiding-principle dimension of
the addressed Confucian harmony-complementarity-seeking approach as a whole.
As explained in the suggested overall-complementarity-seeking account, there are
three distinct main types of complementarity-seeking perspectives (instead of
harmonious-complementarity-seeking perspective only) that point respectively to three
representative types of contrary cases: (A) seeking concordant (harmonious)
complementarity (between those contraries that do or can harmoniously work together),
as shown in the Yin-Yang model of how to look at contraries, (B) seeking restrictive
complementarity (between those contradictory contraries that would or might result in
or from sublation), as shown in the Hegelian model of how to look at contraries, and
(C) seeking critical-reflection-generated complementarity (when facing a contrary that
includes neither eligible perspective nor adequate guiding principle). The foregoing
three types of seeking complementarity, (A), (B) and (C), are to be captured
respectively by the (A)-related adequacy condition of capturing/seeking concordant
complementarity between contraries within their unity [i.e., the concordantcomplementarity-seeking condition (1)], the (B)-related adequacy conditions, which
include the adequacy condition of capturing restrictive complementarity between
contradictory contraries within their unity [i.e., the restrictive-complementarityseeking condition (2)] and the adequacy condition of seeking sublation and postsublation complementarity between new contraries “sublated” from original contraries
[i.e., ‘the post-sublation-complementarity-seeking condition (3)], and the (C)-related
adequacy condition of seeking critical-reflection-generated complementarity [i.e., ‘the
critical-reflection-generated-complementarity-seeking condition (4)].
Can we “reconceptualize” or “reconstruct” Confucian harmony-seeking account to
cover the other types of complementarity cases so that the thus substantially expanded
account can be still rendered ‘Confucian’? An ad hoc current account is open to or can
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be further developed into a more complete account; however, the resulting account that
would be more complete might not keep its original identity (in this case, “Confucian”)
for three considerations. First, there is the genuine and substantial distinction between
the addressed three types of contrary cases so that the three types of complementarityseeking methodological perspectives should not be conflated. Second, there needs to
give due substantial credit to the newly added content if it has its previous “ownership”,
i.e., the correctly-identified previous thinker or text who or which first explicitly
delivers the addressed substantial thought (though it might be already implicitly in the
folk discourse in a pre-theoretic way) in terms of this thinker’s or the text’s own
relevant conceptual and explanatory resources relatively articulated in the text; among
others, the second type of contrary case is treated by the Hegelian methodological
model with its articulated “thesis-antithesis-synthesis through sublation” resources,
which was not in the previous Confucian resources. It is noted that the fact that the
previous account with a certain identity is compatible with or open to being expanded
to a more complete account does not imply that the expanded resulting account must
substantially keep its original identity. Third, if one maintains that the words, say,
‘Confucian’ and ‘harmony’ are just used in some expanded or “reconceptualized”
meanings in one’s own account, that would make a weaker case in this sense: that
would bring the discussion to a mere verbal disagreement and have the discussion lose
its philosophically substantial interest and engaging point in this connection.
Let me use a real-life recent example for (more or less) illustration of some of the
foregoing theoretic points. Consider our current international virtual conference with
its multiple roundtable discussion sessions on cross-tradition engagement on a range of
jointly concerned issues and topics. As for its primary goal, if one would say “Let us
harmonize (to each other)!”, many participants might feel either odd or a bit lost: they
perhaps first think about their interpersonal relationship: “Well, we as philosophy
colleagues already have our more or less ‘harmonious’ relationship to the extent that
we come together in this conference as an academic get-together meeting through
international academic cooperation.” Rather, as stated in the description of the goal and
emphasis of this conference: how distinct approaches and resources from different
philosophical traditions (whether distinguished culturally or by style/ orientation), or
from some (ancient) philosophical tradition and contemporary scholarship (philosophy
or other intellectual pursuits), can talk to (rather than failing to communicate and
understand), engage with (rather than passing by) and learn from (rather than totally
rejecting or dismissing) each other and jointly make constructive contributions to the
development of philosophy and of contemporary society on the addressed jointlyconcerned issues/topics. The above phrase ‘learn from (rather than totally rejecting or
dismissing) each other and jointly make constructive contributions’ can be rephrased
as “learn from each other and make joint contribution in a complementary way” in the
multiple sense of ‘complementary’ that different approaches can be mutually
supportive and supplementary to each other in achieving a complete account of the
issue: either [A] different perspectives per se (or the distinct perspective dimensions of
different approaches) are all eligible in the sense that they point to and capture some
distinct aspects of the issue under examination and thus they themselves are
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harmoniously complementary to each other, or [B] some contrary approaches need to
undergo “sublation”, keeping what are reasonable and valuable while disregarding
what not (say, some inadequate parts of the guiding-principle dimensions of the
different approaches under examination) and thus some of their original “core”
identities would change, or [C] when, though rare cases, facing a contrary approach
that might be totally mistaken (including neither eligible perspective elements nor
adequate guiding-principle element in the addressed different ideological contraries),
we can take a critical-reflection-generating-complementarity-seeking approach to
constructively learn from mistakes and lessons.
At this ending moment, I would like to emphasize one point that
underlies the overall-complementarity-seeking account of how to look at contraries,
i.e., the strategic truth-pursuit goal18 which constitutes one normative basis for mutual
understanding, critical engagement and joint contributions between distinct ideological
approaches (given an object of study) and one guiding basis for the issue of how overall
complementarity is possible. The strategic truth-pursuit goal points to one crosstradition shared vision and humanistic spirit that is jointly captured by one ancient
maxim from the classical Chinese philosophy “朝聞道夕死可矣”19 [literally, having
heard the Dao in the morning, one may die content in the evening] and one ancient
maxim from the classical Greek philosophy “Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas”
[Plato is my friend, but truth is a better friend (often translated into Chinese “我爱我师,
我更爱真理”)].20 While seeking harmony as one primary normative goal is one very
worthy and significant approach in the area of social-political philosophy concerning
how to treat the social relationship between different humans or human groups, it is
intrinsically related to the truth-pursuit guided overall-complementarity-seeking
approach in this sense: establishing a harmonious social relationship between different
humans and between contrary human groups is fundamentally related to how to
adequately look at the relation between diverse humans’ and human groups’ distinct
ideological approaches in a complementary way, which might resort to either
concordant/harmonious complementarity or restrictive complementarity or criticalreflection-generated complementarity, sensitive to the nature of contraries (differences,
tensions or conflicts) and situations/contexts, and fundamentally guided by the strategic
truth-pursuit goal. Methodologically, seeking the truth-pursuit guided overallcomplementarity is more inclusive than seeking harmony (harmonious/concordant
complementarity); an overall-complementarity-seeking account not only includes but
also transcends harmonious-complementarity-seeking perspective.

18

By ‘truth’ I mean what is captured by people’s pre-theoretic “way-things-are-capturing” understanding
of truth, which plays its fundamental and indispensable explanatory role both in the folk discourse and
in the theoretic setting of various intellectual pursuits of “how things are”, instead of something else.
The Dao-pursuit in the classical Chinese philosophy, especially in the tradition of philosophical Daoism,
is essentially a variant version of the truth pursuit in Chinese philosophy. (For this author’s detailed
discussion of these issues, see Mou 2018).
19
The Analects 4.08 (《论语·里仁》).
20
The maxim is often attributed to Aristotle, as a paraphrase of the Nicomachean Ethics 1096a11–15.
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APPENDIX:
SOME PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL RESOURCES
AND THEIR RELATED DISTINCTIONS21
In an accessible way, I introduce some preliminary conceptual resources together with
their associated lexical distinctions in need for two purposes: first, to have a refined
understanding and characterization of some methodological concepts and their related
distinctions (among others, ‘methodological perspectives’ and ‘methodological
guiding principles’); second, to more clearly and accurately characterize distinct
dimensions of methodological approaches in philosophical inquiries and thus some
related methodological points of the constructive-engagement strategy. These
conceptual resources concerning method or methodological approach to an object of
study, together their associated lexical distinctions, are rendered “preliminary” in a
double sense: first, as addressed above, they are in need to refine our understanding of
distinct dimensions of a methodological approach for the sake of a sophisticated
analysis and treatment of methodology in the subsequent discussion; second, they do
not result from mere armchair speculation but from reflective elaboration of what
people actually look at things in their folk lives: this real-life source provides a solid
basis for a refined elaboration of the meta-methodological resources in crosstradition/cross-approach engagement and also have them easily understood when
delivered in an accessible way.
It is known that the term ‘method’ or ‘methodological approach’ in philosophical
inquiries can mean several things. Given that the term ‘method’ or ‘methodological
approach’ means a way of responding to how to approach an object of study, there is
the distinction between three kinds of ways or methods, which constitute three distinct
dimensions of a methodological approach as a whole, i.e., a methodological perspective
(or a perspective method), a methodological instrument (or an instrumental method),
and a methodological guiding principle (or a guiding-principle method), as specified
below.
1. A methodological perspective (or a perspective method) is a way of approaching
an object of study22 and is intended to point to or focus on a certain aspect of the object
and capture or explain that aspect in terms of the characteristics of that aspect, given or
assuming that the object possesses that aspect. There are two important distinctions
concerning methodological perspectives. First, there is the distinction between eligible
and ineligible methodological perspectives. If the object does possess that aspect to
which a (token of) methodological perspective (type) is intended to point, the
methodological perspective is considered eligible regarding that object. Otherwise, the
21

The preliminary materials here are largely excerpts from section 0.2.3 of Mou 2020.
As indicated before, the identity of a (genuine) object of study in philosophical or other intellectual
pursuits of “how things are” is understood broadly: as a naturally produced object in physical reality, a
constructed object in social reality, a “linguistic” object (such as a word), an abstract object in
philosophical theory, or an “issue” object in philosophy (such as the philosophical issue of truth with its
distinct but related dimensions), referentially accessible and critically communicable among participants
in philosophical dialogue. For more explanation on this, see Mou 2020, section 1.1.5.

22
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methodological perspective is considered ineligible regarding that object. It is also
noted that a perspective type, generally speaking, cannot be indiscriminately rendered
eligible regarding all of jointly concerned objects of study; whether or not a specific
token of a certain perspective type regarding one specific object of study is eligible
depends on whether or not it really points to and captures some aspect or layer of the
object of study.23
Second, there is the distinction between a methodological-perspective simplex and
a methodological-perspective complex. A simplex is a single discernible
methodological perspective, and a complex is either a combination of simplexes
(“multiple perspective complex”) or an association of one perspective (simplex) with a
certain methodological guiding principle (“guiding-principle-associated perspective
complex”). By “perspective” below I mean a methodological perspective simplex
unless otherwise indicated.
2. A methodological instrument (or an instrumental method) is a way in which to
implement, or give tools to realize, a certain methodological perspective.
Methodological instruments are largely neutral in the sense that they can serve to
implement different methodological perspectives, though there is still the distinction
between more and less effective methodological instruments regarding a given
methodological perspective.
3. A methodological guiding principle (or a guiding-principle method) regulates
and guides a certain methodological perspective (or perspectives) with regard to an
object of study. Explicitly assumed or implicitly presupposed by the agent, it guides
and regulates how the perspective should be chosen and evaluated and contributes to
the establishment of its desiderata (especially, the purpose and focus that it is to serve).
There is the distinction between adequate and inadequate methodological guiding
principles concerning methodological perspective(s) regarding an object of study. For
example, in looking at the relation between the agent’s current perspective in treating
an object of study and other eligible perspectives (if any), a methodological guiding
principle is considered adequate (in regard to recognizing perspective eligibility) when
it allows in other eligible perspectives to complement the application of the current
perspective and thus has the agent realize that these eligible perspectives do separately
capture distinct aspects of the object and thus can jointly make complementary
contributions to capturing the way the object is. It is considered inadequate if otherwise.
Given the above specifications, there are two preliminary points concerning the
relation between a methodological perspective and a methodological guiding principle
that are especially relevant.24 First, generally speaking, the merit, status, and function
of a methodological perspective (a methodological-perspective simplex) per se can be
evaluated independently of certain methodological guiding principles that the agent
might presuppose in her actual application of the perspective. One’s reflective practice
23

Whether or not there can be an eligible perspective type whose designated “aspect” would be really
possessed by any objects of study is largely a metaphysical issue which I do not intend to pursue here.
24
These two points are further explained and illustrated in the cross-tradition case analysis of Socrates’
and Confucius’ distinct methodological perspectives in treating the issue of filial piety in chapter 5 of
Mou 2020.
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per se of taking a certain eligible methodological perspective as a working perspective
is philosophically positive and innocent in the following senses, whether or not it is
associated with or guided by an adequate or inadequate methodological guiding
principle in one’s application of the perspective. On the one hand, it is philosophically
positive insofar as that perspective really points to or captures a certain aspect of the
object and is thus eligible; on the other hand, it is philosophically innocent insofar as
one’s reflective practice per se of taking that perspective amounts neither to one’s
losing sight of other genuine aspects of the object nor to one’s rejecting other eligible
perspectives in one’s background thinking nor to one’s presupposing an inadequate
methodological guiding principle that would render ineligible other eligible
methodological perspectives (if any). In this way, even if an agent’s methodological
guiding principle is inadequate in her applying a certain eligible methodological
perspective, the eligibility of the methodological perspective still needs to be
recognized, and her reflective practice per se of taking that perspective still has its due
value in philosophical inquiry.
Second, however, it is indeed important for the agent to have an adequate
methodological guiding principle, which the agent is expected to presuppose in
evaluating the status and nature of the eligible methodological perspectives, applying
her methodological perspective, and looking at the relation between her current
working perspective and other perspectives. For it does matter whether one’s taking a
certain methodological perspective is regulated by an adequate or inadequate guiding
principle, especially for the sake of constructive engagement of seemingly competing
approaches. When one’s application of an eligible methodological perspective as one’s
working perspective is guided by some adequate guiding principle and thus contributes
to a holistic understanding of the object of study, one’s application of that perspective
would be philosophically constructive and sighted insofar as one would constructively
treat other eligible methodological perspectives (if any) and their relation to one’s
working perspective and thus have a comprehensive outlook for the sake of a complete
account of the object of study. Otherwise, it would be philosophically less constructive
and less sighted (or even blind) in that connection—but, even so, the reflective practice
per se of taking that eligible perspective can be still philosophically positive and
innocent in the foregoing senses, as indicated before.
In the context of philosophical inquiry, for one thing, there is the need to refine the
notion of methodological approach into these three distinct but related notions of
methodological approach for the sake of adequately characterizing the foregoing three
distinct but related methodological ways (in philosophical inquiry). For another thing,
in view of their distinction and connection at least at the conceptual level, we might as
well regard the three methodological ways as three dimensions of (philosophical)
methodology or of the concept of methodological approach, although this by no means
takes for granted that any methodological way that has ever been historically taken was
actually presented in its agent’ ideas and texts indiscriminately as an methodological
approach that would manifestly reveal all the three dimensions.
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POSTSCRIPT
Chenyang Li presents a very thoughtful and valuable “discussion” essay [Chenyang Li
(2022), “Harmony and Complementarity: A Discussion with Bo Mou”, Comparative
Philosophy 13.2: 145-154 (‘Li 2022*’ for short to distinguish it from Li 2022 in the
“References” above)] on my “commentary” article on his Confucian harmony-seeking
account, which deserves further careful reflection. With limited time and space, in the
“constructive-engagement” methodological spirit and as one channel of continuing
learning from Li’s thought while constructively engaging with his approach, I would
like to make several brief commentary remarks, which are not to cover each of his
points in the “response” part of his paper (as my “commentary” paper has already more
or less discussed some of them) but focus on his five-point remarks on how his account
differs from my account (Li 2022*, 150-152) and his four-point remarks on his
harmony outlook (op.cit., 152-153), both of which are interesting and engaging.
About Li’ first point on the differences. Li states that “Mou’s characterization in
terms of “critical reflection” suggests that his account is framed within the context of
human agency….The kind of harmony that I have reconstructed also includes
harmonies without human agency, and hence without critical reflection. On my account,
for example, the world has come through a process of harmonization, from the
primordial state of qi, to the interactive play of the forces of yin and yang, further to
the evolution of various species on Earth, all prior to the emergence of humanity”
(op.cit.,150). Li’s observation is correct in this connection: the suggested overallcomplementarity-seeking account of how to look at contraries is a (meta-)
methodological account, neither an account in social-political philosophy nor a
comprehensive metaphysical account. However, first, this meta-methodological
account together with its truth-pursuit normative basis can be compatible with distinct
metaphysical accounts, in view that the notion of truth presupposed in the truth-pursuit
goal of philosophical and other intellectual pursuits of “how things are” is essentially
people’s pre-theoretic “way-things-are-capturing” understanding, which is a “semantic”
notion rather than a “metaphysical” notion (if its nature is characterized in such
theoretic terms). Second, the three type of seeking overall complementarity of
contraries (as explained before) point respectively to distinct types of complementarity
that exist between different objects and/or between distinct aspects of an object.
About Li’s second point on the differences (op.cit., 150). It is his critique of the
usage of the term ‘contraries’ in my account. I think this is a mere verbal disagreement:
I simply use the term ‘contraries’ in a very inclusive way, instead of being restricted to
Li’s narrow usage. Actually, at the end of the passage on this point, Li makes a correct
observation about my way of using this term: “The characterization in terms of
“contraries”, however, may not be central to Mou’s account. They could serve as a
metaphor with general applications. Understood loosely, it could be taken to cover
broadly yin-yang contraries, thesis-antithesis contraries, distinct perspectives,
differences, tensions, conflicts, and so forth [note: Mou indicated this broad
understanding during our panel discussion]. If so, Mou’s use of “contraries” does not
constitute a meaningful difference between his and my models” (ibid.).
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About Li’s third point on the difference (op.cit., 150-151). This point is substantial
and engaging:
Mou’s account is framed in terms of complementarity, my account of harmony is more
than complementarity. To be complementary usually means mutually supplying what each
other lacks. While my account of harmony includes complementarity in that sense, it is not
limited to complementarity. We may find complementarity in the process of “coordination
and cooperation” in my definition of harmony. However, my account of harmony also
includes transformation and growth, and renewal. ...Dynamic harmony requires active
engagement and mutual transformation in their harmonizing process. In other words, when
“harmony” is understood in the way I reconstructed from the Confucian tradition, it
includes complementarity as a component but is a broader concept than complementarity.
It demands more than complementarity.

Frankly, I disagree to Li’s judgement in this crucial connection for two reasons. First,
in this passage, Li has yet to do justice to what overall complementarity really means
in my account, although he has faithfully recognized (in the first part of his “discussion”
essay, see op.cit., 147) my distinction of three representative types of complementarity,
harmonious/concordant complementarity, restrictive complementarity, and criticalreflection-generated complementarity, instead of harmonious complementarity only.
Methodologically, harmony in his account (i.e., strictly speaking, the methodological
portion of his account concerning how to look at contraries, as explained before) is
what is called ‘harmonious/concordant complementarity” in my account, which is
included as one component in my account. Second, would Li’s notion of “harmony” be
inclusive, say, including the “sublation”-related restrictive complementarity?
According to the relevant characterization of “harmony” in Li 2014 which is reiterated
in his current essay, harmony allows the development of “transformation and growth”;
such transformation and growth is through “coordination”: that is, as already addressed
in my “commentary” paper, internal coordination is to go without the involved parties
losing their “core” identities (without “negating one other”), even if in dynamic
changing process with addressed “transformation, growth and renewal”, which is
illustrated by his cited “dish cooking” and “music making” metaphors (Li 2022, 2-3)
(also cf., Zhang Dainian’s characterization in Zhang 1988, which the author cites in Li
2020, 171). Harmony with transformation and growth through such “coordination” is
substantially different from the case of “restrictively-complementary” contraries as
captured by the Hegelian model (internal contradictory elements in thesis and antithesis can develop to the stage of negating one other and move into their “synthesis”
thought sublation). That is, such development of harmony is through internal
coordination within the unity of contraries reaching harmony or “harmonious balance”,
rather than through “sublation” reaching “synthesis” or “synthetic balance”.25 Indeed,
25

If one “reconstructs” the usage of the very term ‘harmony’ to let it stipulatively cover the “sublation”type of transformation, then methodologically such “reconceptualized” or “reconstructed” notion of
harmony is not of the Yin-Yang model (with the original basic meaning of ‘和’ (he)/’harmony’), much
less Confucian; rather, one would need to give the due credit to the methodological dimension of Hegel’s
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this is one substantial disagreement between Li’s account and my account. In this
crucial connection, I maintain the major conclusion made in my “commentary” paper:
methodologically, seeking the truth-pursuit-guided overall-complementarity is more
inclusive than seeking harmony (harmonious/concordant complementarity); an overallcomplementarity-seeking account not only includes but also transcends harmoniouscomplementarity-seeking perspective.
About Li’s fourth point on the differences (op.cit., 151). Li states that my account
“maintain largely a binary structure…usually implies only two involved parties”. I am
afraid that this is an incorrect understanding of my account in this connection. As
emphasized in my account, “…in a given unity or situation, the relevant contributing
contraries might be more than two; however, both for the theoretic sake [i.e., one can
always identify one primary pair of contraries in a given stage of process of interaction
and transformation, in line with both models in this connection] and for the practical
convenience, ‘contraries’ is assumed to be two contraries as a primary pair of contraries
in the following…” (Mou 2020, 215; Mou 2022, 123).
About Li’s fifth point on the differences (op.cit., 151-152). Li states that his
approach “takes yin and yang not merely as terminology, but also as qualities in an
ontological sense…as relation-based qualities rather than entity-based qualities… On
such a view, yin and yang are relative qualities rather than entity-based
qualities.…since relations may exist between things or people in multiple dimensions,
their yin-yang relations may vary across these dimensions….
harmonies between things or people are not only more than those between contraries
or a matter of complementarity, but they are also multi-dimensioned.” Although it is
unclear whether or how Li’s foregoing remarks really capture any substantial difference
between our respective accounts, I have one brief commentary note here: when the two
terms ‘yin’ and ‘yang’ (like the terms ‘thesis’ and ‘anti-thesis’) used in my
methodological account, that does not amount to reducing yin and yang to merely
terminology: rather, the semantic references of the two terms ‘yin’ and ‘yang’ are very
inclusive, restricted to neither “entity-based qualities” nor “relation-based qualities”.
My commentary on Li’s four-point summary of his harmony outlook is one general
point concerning all of Li’s four points, instead of a point-by-point analysis. It is noted
that essentially all the four points are concerned about the “harmony” relation between
“we” as human agents: one key term running through all the four points is ‘we’ that
designates we as human agents, as cited below (op.cit., 152-153; emphasis in italics is
mine): <1> the first one is a kind of metaphysical outlook to “understand processes in
the world as harmonies and disharmonies…. What we have become now is already
results of previous harmonizing processes and what we will be depends largely on how
we will be transformed in the future processes”; <2> the second one is that “we will
thought regarding its explicit theoretic work on the sublation type of transformation that involves what
I label ‘restrictive complementarity’, although in my view all types of complementarity seeking exist in
the folk discourse with their pre-theoretic understandings. With this consideration, methodologically, I
render my own overall-complementarity-seeking account neither Yin-Yang model based only nor
Hegelian model based only; rather, I recognize both as parts of its major sources.
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value harmony…we will value working together, with one another or each other, with
other groups and communities, other races and other countries, with the environment,
etc. It brings us together, builds common grounds, and enables us to join forces in the
world to move forward”; <3> the third one is that “we recognize differences in the
world, between you and me, between us and other groups, and so forth. Absolute
uniformity should not be our goal. Such an understanding requires tolerance and
accommodation”; <4> the third point is that “as far as human society is concerned, we
will be prepared to adjust ourselves when appropriate as we attempt to change others”.
It is noted that all these points are directly about intern-personal relationship between
“we” as human agents.
My general point consists of two related commentary notes on his foregoing
harmony outlook. (1) Li’s harmony outlook as given here is rather a social-political
account concerning intern-personal relationship between “we” as human agents than a
methodological account concerning how to look at contraries as distinct ideological
approaches/resources; they are not the same thing, as already highlighted at the outset
of the “commentary” part of my “commentary” article (see 131-132). (2) The
methodological implication of his harmony outlook (i.e., its harmoniouscomplementarity-seeking perspective to the issue of how to look at contraries can be
included in, rather than including as part of his account, my suggested and explained
overall-complementary-seeking account, as explained before. To hit the point home, it
is arguably correct that seeking harmonious interpersonal relationship between “we” as
human agents is neither sufficient nor necessary for seeking overall-complementarity
of distinct ideological approaches as contraries. On the one hand, it is not sufficient in
the sense that, even if the two (or more than two) persons have their harmonious
interpersonal relationship, this does not automatically imply that their distinct
ideological approaches as a whole must be harmoniously complementary; on the other
hand, it is not necessary in the sense that, even if the two (or more than two) persons
do not have their harmonious interpersonal relationship, this does not automatically
imply that their distinct ideological approaches cannot be harmoniously
complementary. We can easily identify real-life examples for illustration of both.
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